Need-For-Approval and Physical versus Social Reality Effects on Judgemental Shifts by Blonsky, Melvin Ronald
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
8-1-1967
Need-For-Approval and Physical versus Social
Reality Effects on Judgemental Shifts
Melvin Ronald Blonsky
University of Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blonsky, Melvin Ronald, "Need-For-Approval and Physical versus Social Reality Effects on Judgemental Shifts" (1967). Student Work.
1886.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/1886
NEED-FOR-APPROVAL AND PHYSICAL VERSUS 
SOCIAL REALITY EFFECTS ON 
JUDGEMENTAL SHIFTS
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Department of Psychology 
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College 
University of Omaha 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
by
Melvin Ronald Blonsky 
August, 1967
UMI Number: EP73526
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation PtM sM ng
UMI EP73526
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College of 
the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree Master of Arts.
irman // Depa^tmCha tment,
Graduate Committee
4£
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The investigator extends his gratitude to:
Dr. Richard W. Nicholson, his advisor, for his help 
and guidance in this research and in graduate school.
Drs. Cora Martin, J. Johnston and R. Wikoff, his 
committee members, for their counsel and advice.
Dr. Graham Vaughan, University of Illinois, for his 
suggestions.
The Organizational Psychology Laboratory for provision 
of research funds and facilities to carry out this investi­
gation.
Dan Schooley, whose mathematical insight made completion 
of this thesis possible.
Mrs. Toby Cohen, for her excellent typing.
His parents, Maurice and Jeannette Blonsky, without 
whose dedication and patience, this thesis could not have 
been completed.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . .    . . . . .  vi
LIST OF FIGURES  ............    viii
LIST OF SYMBOLS  .........................   ix
ABSTRACT  ............................   x
INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES  .............  1
Introduction...................    1
Problem...................    8
The Experimental Situation   . 9
H y p o t h e s e s ..................................   10
Hypothesis 1 Assumptions and Statement . . . .  11
Assumptions................................  11
Hypothesis 1 ..............    11
Hypothesis 2 Assumptions and Statement . . . . 11
Assumptions.....................   11
Hypothesis 2 .....................   11
Hypothesis 3a and 3b Assumptions and
Statements .    11
Assumptions.................  11
Hypothesis 3a   . . . . . . . .  12
Hypothesis 3b .  ..........................  12
M E T H O D............      13
Pre-experimental Measures  .....................  13
Personal Reaction Inventory .................  13
DeKalb Survey T e s t ............................  14
Experimental M e a s u r e ............    15
Post-experimental Awareness Questionnaire . . . .  15
S u b j e c t s .........................................  16
Conduct of the Experiment . .  ................. . 17
Pre-experimental procedure .........   17
Experimental procedures ............   18
Preliminary Analytical Considerations ........... 19
Loss of Subjects.........................   . 19
PRI Categorization............................  20
I-E Categorization............    20
D esign ....................   .     20
iv
Page
RESULTS ...................   22
Correlational Analyses . . .    22
Analysis of Variance and Post-Hoc
Comparison Results..............    23
Results for Hypothesis 1 . . . . .    26
Results for Hypothesis 2 ......................  27
Results for Hypotheses 3a and 3 b ..............  28
DISCUSSION AND C O N CLUSIONS...............  30
LIST OF R E F E R E N C E S ..................................  35
General References..........    37
APPENDIX A: PHYSICAL REALITY SLIDES ............... 38
APPENDIX B: SOCIAL REALITY S L I D E S ................ . 42
APPENDIX C: SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF AN
INDIVIDUAL PANEL  .................  46
APPENDIX D: SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE
INDIVIDUAL PANELS CONNECTED   . 47
APPENDIX E: SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE
INDIVIDUAL PANEL RATIO SELECTOR . . . .  48
APPENDIX F: SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE
MASTER P A N E L ......................... . . 49
APPENDIX G: SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE
MASTER PANEL CONNECTION TO THE
INDIVIDUAL P A N E L S .....................  50
APPENDIX H: PERSONAL REACTION INVENTORY ..........  51
APPENDIX I: DEKALB SURVEY T E S T S ................ . . 54
APPENDIX J: AWARENESS CRITERIA.....................  59
APPENDIX K: PHYSICAL REALITY INSTRUCTIONS. . . . . .  60
APPENDIX L: SOCIAL REALITY INSTRUCTIONS . ... . . .  62
APPENDIX M: PHYSICAL REALITY ANSWER SHEETS . . . . .  64
APPENDIX N: SOCIAL REALITY ANSWER SHEETS ..........  65
APPENDIX O: PRI SCALE N O R M S ..........   66
VPage
APPENDIX P: I-E SCALE NORMS  .....................  68
APPENDIX Q: COMPOSITION OF EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS . . 69
APPENDIX R: MEAN SUMMARIES OF JUDGMENTAL
SHIFTS ACROSS NINE TRIALS ............. 70
APPENDIX S: SIMPLE EFFECT MEAN SUMMARY
FOR PRI X I - E .......................... 71
APPENDIX T: SIMPLE EFFECT MEAN SUMMARY
FOR I-E X REALITY.....................  7 2
APPENDIX US' SIMPLE EFFECT MEAN SUMMARY
FOR PRESSURE X R E A L I T Y .............   73
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Pearson—Product—Moment Coreelations 
between PRI, I-E and Judgmental
Shifts  ..........................   22
2. Multiple correlations between Reality-
Pressure and Judgmental Shifts . . . . . .  23
3. Analysis of Variance Summary (Least 
Squares) for the Judgmental Shift
Criterion . . . . . . . . . .  .............  24
4. Analysis of Variance Summary for
Simple Main Effects ........... . . . . .  25
5. Means for PRI Categorization in
Physical Reality in High Pressure . . . .  26
6. Orthogonal Planned Comparison
Test of Hypothesis 1 .....................  27
7. Judgmental Shift Means for PRI 
Categorization in Social Reality
in High Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
8. Orthogonal Planned Comparison
Test of Hypothesis 2 . . . . . . . . . .  . 28
9. Means for Tests of Hypotheses
3a and 3 b ........................  29
10. Derivation of the Sensitivity
C r i t e r i o n ..........................      29
11. Planned Comparison Tests of
Hypotheses 3a and 3 b ........................  29
vii
Appendix
Table Page
Al. Personal Reaction Inventory
Scale N o r m s .......................    66
A2. James (1963) I-E Scale Norms .  ........... - 68
A3. Mean Summaries of Judgmental
Shifts Across Nine Trials ...................  70
A4. Simple Effect Mean Summary
for PRI X I-E  ...................  71
A5. Simple Effect Mean Summary
for* I—E X Reality............................ 72
A6. Simple Effect Mean Summary
for Pressure X Reality . . . . . . . . . .  73
LIST OF FIGURES
Appendix
Figure Page
Al. Schematic Drawing of an
Individual P a n e l ............. ...........   46
A2. Schematic drawing of the
Individual ^Panels Connected .   47
A3. Schematic drawing of the
Individual Panel Ratio
Selector.....................................  48
A4. Schematic Drawing of the
Master Panel ................................. 49
A5. Schematic Drawing of the
Master Panel Connection to
the Individual Panels .     50
A6. Composition of Experimental Groups . . . .  69
LIST OF SYMBOLS
TRAITS
PRI
I-E
nApp
TREATMENTS
P 0R.
S 0R.
H 0P.
L.P.
CRITERION
Personal Reaction Inventory
Internal versus External Control Scale
Need~for-Approval
Physical Reality 
Social Reality 
High Pressure 
Low Pressure
d Mean difference between high and low pressure 
in stated conditions
XABSTRACT
Since the recent emergence of conformity research, few 
investigations have attempted to relate judgmental shifts 
to both relevant personality dimensions and different psy­
chological situations, i.e., physical and social reality.
The E studied the effects of need-for-approval, internal 
versus external locus of reinforcement, pressure,and physi­
cal versus social reality on judgmental shifts. A completely 
crossed-factorial design with two levels of each factor was 
used. The criterion was the mean number of judgmental shifts, 
with the latter being defined as a shift in judgment from an 
initial position about a stimulus object to an alternative 
position.
The Ss were 160 female introductory psychology students. 
Experimental groups (n=5) were tested via a modified Crutch­
field apparatus in the presence of the E.. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions: 
physical reality-high pressure; physical reality-low pres­
sure; social reality-high pressure; and social reality-low 
pressure. The physical reality task necessitated a judgment 
as to the larger of two clusters of dots on each of nine 
trials. The task of social reality required a judgment on 
each of nine trials as to whether or not pictures of men,
xi
some having been described as convicted murderers, were in 
fact convicted murderers. High pressure was defined as the 
apparent disagreement of three and agreement of one member 
about a judgment, or disagreement by all four members of the 
group. Low pressure was composed of three agreeing and one 
disagreeing member of the group or four agreements.
Analysis of variance revealed that I—E and pressure were 
significant main effects. Analysis of simple main effects 
showed that pressure was significant for both reality levels, 
need—for—approval was significant for I-E, and that I-E was 
significant for high need-for—approval JBs, and social reality.
The major findings were:
1. Low need—for—approval S_s do not differ in number of 
judgmental shifts in either reality.
2. High and low need-for-approval Ss_ do not differ in 
mean number of judgmental shifts in physical reality when 
exposed to high pressure.
3. Social reality does not seem to create a difference 
between high and low need-for—approval Sj3 in judgmental 
shifts under a condition of high pressure.
4. No distinction between the psychological relevance 
of social and physical reality was found for high need-for- 
approval Ss.
The investigator concluded that further research is 
needed to find personality correlates of judgmental shift­
ing behavior, and that there should be more work done in an
r
attempt to delineate the dimension called "social reality".

1INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
Introduction
A critical area of social psychology open to behavioral 
investigation is the assessment and prediction of conforming 
behavior in varying situations, i.e., physical and social 
reality. Little attempt has been made to deal with the 
dimensions of task difficulty and/or stimulus ambiguity. 
Festinger (1950, p. 272) defined physical reality as a 
continuum along which "...the subjective validity of opinions, 
attitudes, and beliefs may be said to lie." At the end of 
the continuum where there is complete dependence on physi­
cal reality for the subjective validity of one1s beliefs 
or opinions, the dependence upon other people for the 
confidence one has in these opinions is very low or zero.
When dependence upon physical reality is low, dependence 
upon social reality is high, i.e., a belief, opinion, or 
attitude is "correct to the extent that it is anchored in 
a group of people with similar beliefs, opinions, and atti­
tudes. Newcomb, Turner and Converse (1965) stated that 
cognitive norms that do not correspond to any physical 
reality have effects that are just as real as those that 
do. Such effects differ principally from those corres­
ponding to physical reality in that they depend exclusively
upon sharing.
Past work on conformity has dealt with relatively 
unambiguous stimulus situations. "When the judgmental 
situation is anchored in unambiguous stimulus information, 
the resistance to conformity pressures will be greater. 
Conversely, the resistance will be lower the more ambiguous 
the information. Therefore, stimulus situations anchored 
only in social reality will exhibit more conforming be­
havior (Secord and Backman, 1964, p. 329).
The modern impetus to conformity research evolved 
from Asch's (1951) classic work on conformity. His work 
was concerned with settings where the stimulus situation, 
but not the stimulus, was ambiguous. Asch placed a single 
individual in the position of a minority of one against a 
wrong and unanimous majority. He used 50 male, college 
students as Ss.. Results indicated that one—third of all 
the critical Ss' responses were errors similar to the 
unanimous majority, but that the majority effect was far 
from complete. Sixty—eight percent of the responses from 
the critical Ss were correct. Asch found that the effect 
of the majority grew stronger as the clarity of the situa­
tion diminished and became ambiguous.
Both Asch (1961) and Festinger (1957) have suggested 
that behavior changes be studied in different situations 
and that psychological qualities of the stimulus situation 
be taken into account when attempting to assess conformity. 
According to Festinger (1954), when a discrepancy exists
with respect to opinions or abilities, there are tendencies 
to change one's own position so as to move closer to others 
in a group.
Crutchfield (1954) cited four criteria as necessary 
for measurement of conformity behavior to group pressure: 
direct behavioral assessment; psychologically relevant 
situations; standardization of group situations; and economy 
in test procedure. The typical Asch situation successfully 
fills only the first two criteria. Several researchers 
(Crutchfield, 1954, 1955; Olmstead & Blake, 1955) modified 
the Asch situation to meet the suggested criteria by using 
a simulated situation which provides a standard social con­
text for all individuals. Subjects are convened in a group 
situation, in which the E controls and manipulates the 
situation. The major advantages are standardization and 
economy.
Crutchfield's (1954) initial studies showed the 
following: the amount of conforming behavior was large;
the kind of stimulus material determined the degree of 
conformity exhibited; high conformists placed emphasis on 
external and socially approved values; female college Ss
conformed more than male college Ss,, and female college)
alumnae exhibited less conformity than found in all other 
groups tested.
Olmstead and Blake (1955) attempted to compare the 
effects of a simulated group with judgments made in a face 
to face, interacting situation. The modifications in
4judgment were somewhat higher in the simulated group than 
in the face to face group. They concluded there was no 
difference between a simulated condition and actual, face 
to face situations.
The work reviewed had demonstrated several findings: 
females tend to conform more than males (Crutchfield, 1955; 
Tuddenahm, 1961; Allen & Crutchfield, 1963)? judgments can 
be altered via group pressure (Asch, 1951? Crutchfield, 
1954); and stimuli which are ambiguous in nature seem to be 
more effective than objective stimuli, when attempting to 
modify attitudes and opinions (Crutchfield, 1954).
According to McGee (1962), to gain meaningful informa­
tion, data must be collected under controlled conditions 
via responses on given personality instruments as a basis 
for predicting behavior in various environmental conditions. 
He contends a criterion of independently measured behavior 
is needed, from which one can say a relation exists between 
response tendencies and basic personality traits. Two such 
instruments are the Marlowe—Crowne-Social-Desirabilitv—Scale 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), and the James (1963) Internal 
versus External Control Scale.
Crowne and Marlowe in their book, The Approval Motive; 
Studies in Evaluative Dependence (1964), reviewed several 
studies pertaining to conformity. Strickland and Crowne 
(1962) explored the concept of conformity as a function of 
need-for-approval (nApp). They utilized simulated group
pressure. Conformity was defined as the public statement 
of a judgment synonymous with that of the majority in the 
absence of logical justification for the statement. The 
subjects were 64 females from introductory psychology 
classes at Ohio State University. The experimental task 
was to report the number of knocks heard from a tape re­
cording of rapping on- a table, which was played for the Ss. 
Immediately following the recording, three accomplices gave 
their judgments by announcing a number, assigned 'a priori' 
by the E.. All accomplices expressed a majority opinion 
and were never in disagreement with one another. The 
critical S_ was always told that she was the fourth S. to 
participate in the experiment. Subjects' PRI scores were 
dichotomized at the mean, 17.83, to form high and low groups. 
High-PRI—scores ranged from 18 to 31 and lows from 2 to 17. 
Differences in yielding were in the predicted direction 
(t, = 3.08, P .01). The authors concluded that high nApp 
persons tend to be characterized by less independence of 
j udgment than lows.
Crowne and Marlowe (1964, pp. 79-84) conducted an 
experiment relating nApp to conformity. The discrimination 
problem was the identification of the larger of 2 clusters 
of dots on each of 20 trials. The stimulus material, 20 
slides, was presented with a slide projector for 1 second 
intervals. To maintain face validity, each slide had a 
different geometric representation of the dots. Subjects
were 26 females from introductory psychology classes at 
Ohio State University, who volunteered to participate in 
an experiment in perceptual speed. Two male and two 
female confederates were trained to play the role of naive 
experimental Ss as credibly as possible. Subjects met in 
a waiting room and were then taken to a room where all Ss 
filled out the PRI. The Ss. were then taken into the 
experimental room and given instructions. The order of 
position of responding by Ss.. was rotated on each trial so 
that each S. responded in each of the five positions on 
four occasions. Pour of the 20 trials were not crucial,
i.e., accomplices replied correctly without comment. In 
10 of the 16 critical conformity trials, confederates 
responded incorrectly without comment. On the remaining 
six trials, labelled "strong pressure" trials, the first 
confederate answered correctly in a hesitant manner. Im­
mediately he was criticized by the other confederates who 
responded incorrectly, whereupon the first accomplice 
changed his reply and responded to the unanimous majority, 
still before the critical S. replied,. Subsequent to the 
experiment each critical S. was given an awareness question­
naire. Scores on the PRI were dichotomized at the overall 
mean of the sample. A S s ' conformity score was the number 
of trials on which she agreed with the group of confederates' 
incorrect majority. The mean number of conforming responses 
for high PRI-scorers was 9.46; for low PRI-scorers the mean 
was 5.46 (done without regard for trial categories). The
difference was significant (t = 2.56, p ^ .02), lending 
further support to the relation between nApp and conformity.
Crowne and Liverant (1963) studied conforming behavior 
as it is related to Social Learning Theory (Rotter, 1954). 
Approval motived Ss were hypothecated to be less able to 
resist group pressure, hence displaying less confidence in 
their judgments. The conformity situation was one in which 
the individual was confronted with conflicting demands. The 
Ss were 40 male and 70 female introductory psychology stu­
dents. The experimental task was to distinguish between 
the larger of 2 clusters of dots on each of 20 trials.
Each experimental group was composed of a naive S. and four 
trained confederates. On each trial, S^ s answered publicly 
as to the larger of the cluster of dots. On the critical 
trials, the confederates announced an incorrect majority 
judgment. Subjects were administered the PRI and the 
Rotter (1942) Level of Aspiration Board. Under one set 
of conditions, normal Asch type instructions were used. In 
the second set of conditions, Ss. were given a certain amount 
of money and allowed to bet on each of their judgments.
The mean amount of conformity of the high nApp group was 
57.44 (n=9) while the mean of the low group was 43.69 (n=13). 
The difference was significant (t = 3.71, p - .01) as pre­
dicted. Amount of yielding did not differebhtween internals 
and externals in the normal Asch situation. However, in 
betting conditions, externals conformed significantly more 
than the internals.
8Odell (1959) used the internal versus external locus 
of control (I-E) dimension to examine conforming behavior in 
an Asch type situation. The I-E scale purports to measure 
the extent to which an individual perceives events as deter­
mined by his own capabilities (internally oriented) versus 
the extent to which he sees events as determined by luck, 
chance, fate or the manipulations pf others (externally 
oriented). He found that externally oriented Ss showed 
greater tendencies to conform then did internally oriented 
Ss. Greene, Lotsof and James (1964) conducted a conformity 
experiment in the same vein as Asch's, but S_s were allowed 
to express their confidence in their judgment by betting 
procedures. Analysis of results for males and females 
indicated that E.'s were more conforming than JE'S on the 
critical trials (P=.05). Confidence was significant for 
females only. Nicholson (1967) studied need-for-approval 
effects in conditions of varying social-evaluation strength. 
When he manipulated public and private announcement of success 
or failure results, he found that high PRI-scorers were 
differentially sensitive to the evaluative situations. 
Nicholson also suggested that a measure Of success and 
failure expectancies should be used in research of need-for- 
approval effects.
Problem
With few exceptions (Wiener, Carpenter and Carpenter, 
1956; McDavid and Sistrunk, 1964), little research has been
concerned with conformity, either within the context of 
reality or as it relates to certain personality correlates. 
Could differences in judgmental shifts, defined as shifts 
in judgment from an initial position about a stimulus object 
to an alternative position, be explained by need-for-approval, 
reality, and pressure effects? If differences could be ex­
plained, could they be accounted for by a PRI-realitv inter­
action? The experimenter provided an experimental situation 
to investigate this problem.
The Experimental Situation
To study the relation between nApp and reality, the 
following situation was created with these characteristics:
1. Two levels of reality were established: physical 
and social. Physical reality was defined as a situation in 
which there was a clear physical referent. The experimental 
condition was one in which a judgment was required as to 
the larger of two clusters of dots on each of nine trials 
(Appendix A). Social reality was defined as a condition
in which no clear physical referent was available. The 
experimental situation required a judgment as to whether or 
not pictures of men, some having been described as convicted 
murderers, were in fact convicted murderers (Appendix B)^ ;.
In this situation, neither a correct answer or a clear 
physical referent was available. Consensual validation 
was a mechanism by which Ss could alter their opinion.
2. Two levels of pressure were created: high and
^These pictures taken from the IES test.
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low. High pressure was structured as the apparent disagree­
ment of three and agreement of one member about a judgment, 
or disagreement by all four members of the group. Low 
pressure was composed of three agreeing and one disagreeing 
member of the group or four agreements.
3. A simulated group situation. Five Ss were simul­
taneously tested per experimental session via a modified 
Crutchfield (1954) apparatus, which allows for individual 
booths. Each booth contained an electrical panel with 
two rows of signal lights which showed the responses of 
the other members of the group (Appendices C-E). The 
panels contained switches by which an individual indicated 
his response. The apparatus was an electrical communication 
system among the five Ss, with no direct, verbal communica­
tion permitted. The task was the same for all members of 
a group, that being judgment of slides shown on a screen 
placed in the front of the experimental room. All booths 
were actually controlled by the E. from the master panel 
(Appendices F-G). The E, transmitted the same information 
to all Sswho believed they were receiving factual infor­
mation from the other members of the group. The order of 
responding was the same for each subject continuously.
Hypotheses
Three sets of hypotheses were tested. The dependent 
variate was defined as the mean number of judgmental shifts.
11
Hypothesis 1 Assumptions and Statement 
Assumptions. Within physical reality, the stimulus 
situation is unambiguous and is clearly distinguishable 
for each subject. This should provide a situation where 
a comparison between high and low-PRJ-scorers can be made in 
terms of judgmental shifts.
Hypothesis 1. High and low-PRI-scorers do not differ 
in judgmental shifts in physical reality in high pressure. 
Specifically,
JJL (High PRI-P. R.-H. P.) =^(Low PRI-P.R.-H. P.)
Hypothesis 2 Assumptions and Statement 
Assumptions. Social Reality does not have a continuum 
or scale of objective belief to which one may refer. An 
individual's opinion or judgment regarding a matter rests 
solely on his own cognitions concerning the object in ques­
tion. The task is structured so that only the consensus of 
peers can be relied upon. This condition should supply an 
opportunity for nApp to be operative.
Hypothesis 2. Shifts in judgment in social reality in 
high pressure are greater for high than low—PRI—scorers.
Spec i fically,
jJL (High PRI-S. R.-H. P. )>ll( Low PRI-S.R.-H. P. )
Hypothesis 3a and 3b Assumptions and Statements 
Assumptions. Social reality, having no clear referent, 
should produce a situation in which nApp is more operative
12
than physical reality, where a physical referent is available. 
Social reality should create more discrepancy and uncer­
tainty than physical reality, and therefore, necessitate 
more restructuring of one's cognitions and belief, which 
might be achieved by compromising to the majority judgment. 
Sensitivity of shifts in judgment was defined as the mean 
difference between high and low pressure with high-PRI- 
scorers in both realities.
Hypothesis 3a. Low PRI-scorers do not differ in 
judgment between high and low pressure in either reality. 
Specifically,
d (S. R. -Low PRI) =d (P. R. -Low PRIV.
Hypothesis 3b. For high—PRI-scorers, the difference 
in judgmental shifts between high and low pressure in 
social reality is significantly greater than high and low 
pressure in physical reality. Specifically, 
d(S .R.—High PRI)>d(P.R.-High PRI).
13
METHOD
Pre-experimental Measures 
Two variates were used as classification factors, the 
PRI and the I—E. These measures were administered during 
one class period to the fall, 1966—67, introductory psy­
chology class. These data wane gathered three months before 
conduct of the experiment.
Personal Reaction Inventory 
Crowne and Marlowe (1960) devised this scale to measure 
nApp. A person scoring high on the scale is said to have a 
high need for social approval, whereas a person scoring low 
is said to have less need for social approval. The model 
for the PRI is a balanced scale, composed of 33 items, 15 
of which are probably true but undesirable statements to 
make of oneself (e.g., "I sometimes try to get even, rather 
than forgive and forget") and 18 items which are defined 
by behaviors which are culturally sanctioned and approved 
but which are improbable of occurrence (e.g., "I'm always 
willing to admit it when I make a mistake"). Items were 
selected to minimize pathological or abnormal implications 
and to meet the criterion of cultural approval. The inter­
nal consistency coefficient for the 33 item scale was .88,
14
while the test—retest correlation was .89 (Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960). This scale is found in Appendix H.
DeKalb Survey Test 
The James I-E Scale, disguised as the "DeKalb Survey 
Test—Form I.E.—1" was developed within the framework of 
Rotter's Social Learning Theory and is based on past work 
by Rotter (1954) and Phares (1956). "The I-E scale involves 
a generalized expectancy that the person's own behavior 
determines the outcome of events or that the outcome is 
beyond his control" (Greene, Lotsof and James, 1964).
Phares (1955) first attempted to measure the internal-ex­
ternal (I-E) control dimension with a 13 item scale, de­
signed to measure the characteristic of attributing the 
occurrence of reinforcements to chance rather than oneself. 
Rotter, Seeman and Liverant (1962) developed an I-E Scale, 
based on a forced choice format, which offered alternatives 
between internal and external control interpretations of 
various events.
James (1963) modified his original scale (James, 1957), 
making it in the format of a Likert type scale, with four 
categories of response for each item: Strongly agree (SA);
Agree (A); Disagree (D); and Strongly Disagree (SD). Items 
are weighted three, two, one and zero, respectively. A 
sample item is: "Wars between countries seem inevitable
despite efforts to prevent them." The test is composed of 
60 items; only the 30 even—numbered items are scored, while
15
the odd-numbered items are filler items.
The total score can range from 0 to 90 with the original 
college population mean being 37 and the standard deviation 
being 12. The scoring of the scale is in the external 
direction; the higher the score, the more externally oriented 
the individual. The split half reliability ranged from .84 
to .96 and retest reliability ranged from .71 (same year) 
to .86 (3 month period) (James, 1966)., This scale is found 
in Appendix I.
Experimental Measure 
Judgment of slides was selected as the experimental 
task. This type of task seemed advantageous for several 
reasons. First, time per experimental session could be held 
to a minimum. This was necessary because experimental time 
available was only 50 minutes. Second, this allowed for 
a task that would be comparable between the two conditions 
of reality. Third, the task made a standard stimulus avail­
able to all Ss simultaneously.
Slides for physical and social reality were tested 
by a series of pilot studies, to insure • maximum variability.
Variability ranged from zero to seven. The dependent 
variate was the number of shifts from an initial judgment- 
about the slides after pressure was exerted by peers.
Post-experimental Awareness Questionnaire 
Informational input regarding Ss ' responses was ex­
perimentally manipulated. Subjects' awareness of this
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deception could affect results. To assess awareness, each 
subject completed the following:
In your own words, briefly tell me what you think
, this experiment was about.
Responses to the questionnaire were analyzed by four graduate 
students, independently, according to the pre-established 
criteria (Appendix J). Written knowledge of deception or 
transmission of false information was analyzed, specifically. 
An open ended questionnaire was utilized to avoid any prompt­
ing or cueing of Ss by the E concerning the true nature of 
the experiment.
Subi ects
Subjects were female students from an introductory 
psychology class at Omaha University. The age of Ss was 
restricted to those who had reached their 17th birthday, 
but had not reached their 22nd birthday. All Ss must have 
completed both the PRI and I-E prior to experimentation.
No S/ participated if she had taken introductory sociology 
within the past academic year, due to the fact that films 
involving conformity studies had been shown in that par­
ticular class. There was a total of 390 females enrolled 
in the course. All members of introductory psychology 
courses are required to participate in three hours of 
psychological experimentation as a course requisite. About 
three months prior to the experiment all members of the 
class were premeasured on the PRI and the I-E.
Approximately four weeks after the premeasures were
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gathered, E. appeared at the start of the class. The inves­
tigator said to the class members:
As you know, a course requisite is that you par­
ticipate in experimental research for a total of 
three hours. I am conducting an experiment to 
investigate perceptual speed and discrimination.
To assist me, I am asking that the girls par­
ticipate in this study. This will take about 
45 minutes of your time. If you participate you 
will receive one hour's research credit. You will 
not be subjected to personal embarrassment or 
discomfort. If you wish to volunteer, I will take 
your name now. The following girls are not eli­
gible to participate in this experiment (read names 
of those not eligible). I will read to you the 
scheduled experimental times. If you cannot appear 
for at least three of these times, please do not 
volunteer. You will be notified several days in 
advance as to the specific time and place. This 
experiment will not begin for several weeks.
These announcements will be made in the usual 
manner. When the experiment is finished, I will 
discuss the results with all of you in class.
Thank you.
Two hundred and twenty-four females volunteered for, 
the experiment, but only 160 girls participated. Extra 
Ss were recruited to insure the required experimental 
group size of five Ss. Awareness effects reduced the 
sample size; therefore, this was considered in the analy­
sis.
Conduct of the Experiment
Pre-experimental procedure 
The investigator used 16 experimental groups to evaluate 
effectiveness of stimulus material, experimental procedures, 
and clarity of instructions. Subjects were asked for help 
and suggestions by which instructions were modified and
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procedures simplified. One classroom was scheduled for a 
period of eight hours per day for five consecutive days.
Information exchange was held to a minimum by schedul­
ing the experiment for only one week, and requesting that 
Ss, not divulge any information concerning the experiment 
until the end of the week. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to all treatment and session combinations.
Initially a seating plan was arranged, but the E. de­
cided not to use it, since it could have seemed "rigged". 
Subjects were allowed to sit at any one of the five seats, 
about 15 inches apart, which were in front of two tables on 
which the cubicles and individual panels were placed. The 
table was 12 feet from a screen, which was in front of 
the experimental room.
Slide order was randomized prior to arrival for each 
experimental group. Pressure ratios were randomized in 
advance for every session. All necessary answer sheets and 
pencils were placed in each cubicle prior to Ss' arrival.
Experimental procedures. The Ss were assembled and 
seated in the experimental room. Instructions (Appendices 
K and L) were given, dependent upon which reality condition 
was being tested. After instructions were read, E., who was 
located five feet in back of the Ss, turned off the lights 
in the experimental room, turned on the slide projector and 
timer, and projected the first slide onto the screen. At 
the end of five seconds, the slide projector moved auto­
matically by the use of an interval timer connected to an
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industrial timer, to a blank space, which allowed sufficient 
light for Ss to mark the answer sheets and flip the electri­
cal switches. When all five S_s had responded, E. first flipped 
the switch for pressure, then the ratio switch, and finally 
the individual switch to transmit the assumed responses to 
the Ss. Then each S. flipped the switch on the individual 
panel to the off position, and replied a second time. When 
the second response was recorded on the E's master panel, 
the E flipped the individual light switch to off, so that 
the lights on the individual Ss' panels would turn off.
The investigator then switched to the next slide and this 
procedure was continued for all nine slides. The experi­
mental time for each group was approximately 15 minutes.
At the end of the series of slides, the investigator passed 
out post-experimental awareness questionnaires and asked 
Ss to complete the questionnaire. Upon completion, -Ss1 
experimental credit cards were signed, Ss were thanked and 
dismissed. Data sheets (Appendices M and N) were collected 
and the experimental room was prepared for the next session.
Preliminary Analytical Considerations
Loss of Subjects 
Awareness questionnaires were analyzed for possible 
awareness of deception and/or manipulation of information.
This resulted in a loss of six Ss.
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PRI Categorization
The premeasures were scored pre-experimentally, but 
Ss were recruited without regard for particular scores. The 
range for the sample (n=154) was from 4 to 28. The sample 
mean was 15.79 and the standard deviation was 5.20. Norms
for the experimental sample and other samples are found in
*
Appendix 0.
Scores of the 154 Ss were dichotomized into high and 
low categories. The range of scores was from 16 to 28, and 
4 to 15, for high and low categories, respectively.
I-E Categorization
Range for the sample was from 15 to 66. The sample
mean was 39.58 and the standard deviation was 9.19. Norms
for the experimental group and other samples are found 
in Appendix P.
Scores for the sample were dichotomized into internal 
and external categories. Scores ranged from 15 to 39, and 
40 to 66, for internal and external categories, respectively.
Design
A fixed-effects model was used for the analyses. A 
completely-crossed, four-factor analysis of variance was 
used. Since loss of Ss due to awareness seemed to be re­
lated to treatment effects, a least-squares solution of the 
analysis of variance was used. Composition of experimental
groups is shown in Appendix Q.
Planned orthogonal comparisons were used to test 
hypotheses one and two because they create a more powerful 
statistical test and reduce redundancy. Hypotheses 3a and 
3b were tested via planned comparisons which were not 
orthogonal. A risk of Type I error (^ = .10) was used.
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RESULTS
Correlational Analyses 
A correlational analysis (n=154) was computed between 
the two factors, PRI and I-E, and the criterion, number of 
judgmental shifts. The results are shown in Table 1. Little 
direct relation between the predictors and criterion was shown.
Table 1
Pearson-Product-Moment Correlations between 
PRI, I-E, and Judgmental Shifts'
PRI I-E Shifts
PRI -.22* .02
I-E .07
Shifts
P^.01
The relation between the PRI and I—E indicated that the two 
personality instruments account for only four percent of 
the variance. Multiple correlations between the trait 
variates and the criterion were computed. The results are 
shown in Table 2. None of the correlations between the 
treatment factors and the criterion were significant, in­
dicating that a trait-treatment explanation was in order. 
Normality of criterion was questionable, consequently these
coefficients should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 2
Multiple Correlations Between Reality-Pressure 
and Judgmental Shifts
Treatment n Judgmental Shifts P
Reality-Pressure 154 .072 N. S .
PR-HP 36 .117 N 0 S .
PR-LP 39 .210 N.S.
SR-HP 39 .065 N.S.
SR-LP 40 .217 N 0S.
Analysis of Variance and Post-Hoc Comparison Results 
The summary of means for the analysis is shown in 
Appendix R. Both a weighted analysis, as Steel and Torrie 
(1960) recommend, and an ultra conservative F test (Box,
1954) were used in the analysis of variance, since the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met (P=.10). 
Winer (1962) states that the F test is robust with respect 
to the assumption of homogeneity of error variance. Results 
of the analysis of variance are shown in Table 3. Since 
some of the interaction effects were significant, a clear 
interpretation of the main effects was not possible.
The extremely large F ratio for the factor pressure 
suggests the general notion that the amount of social pres­
sure induced contributes to the number of shifts in judgment.
189021
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance Summary (Least Squares) 
for the Judgmental Shift Criterion
Source d.f. M.S. F P
A (PRI) 1 .07 9 .045 N.S.
B (I-E) 1 5.815 3. 316 - .10
C (Pressure) 1 66.740 38.053 ^  .001
D (Reality) 1 3.658 2.086 N.S.
A X B 1 11.873 6.769 ^  .01
A X C 1 4.290 2.446 N.S.
A X D 1 2.042 1.164 N.S.
B X C 1 2.860 1.631 N.S.
B X D 1 5.209 2. 970 ^  .10
C X D 1 9.561 5.415 ^  .05
A X B X C 1 4.413 2.516 N.S.
A X B X D 1 3. 096 1.765 N.S.
A X C X D 1 3.360 1.916 N.S.
B X C X D 1 2. 959 1.687 N.S.
A X B X C X D 1 7.407 4.223 ^  . 05
Error 138 1.754
Total 153
The significant C X D and A X B X C X D interactions 
reveal the importance of pressure as a factor in the de­
cision making process. The interactions involving reality, 
B X D, C X D and A X B X C X D, indicate that reality of 
the psychological situation plays a relevant role in the
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development of attitudes and changing of judgment.
A summary of simple main effects is shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Analysis of Variance Summary
for Simple Main Effects
Source d.f. M.S. F P
PRI for Internal 1 7.008 3.995 ^.05
PRI for External 1 14.115 8.047 ^r.01
I-E for high PRI 1 24.067 13.721 ^.001
I—E for low PRI 1 2. 365 1. 348 N.S.
I-E for physical reality 1 .792 .452 N.S.
I—E for social reality 1 5.013 2.858 ^  .10
Reality for Internal .1 3. 938 2.245 N.S.
Reality for External 1 .387 .221 N.S.
Pressurei for phy reality 1 67.379 38.414 £  . 001
Pressure for soc reality 1 11.375 6.485 ^  .05
Reality for high pressure 1 15.803 9.010 ^  .01
Reality for low pressure 1 .916 .522 N.S.
The mean summary for the PRI X I-E interaction (Appen­
dix S) indicated that high PRI.-externally oriented individuals
shifted in judgment more than low PRT-externally oriented 
individuals, which was expected. However, a reversal oc­
curred with internally oriented persons. The internal-low 
PRI—scorer shifted more than the internal—high PRI—scorer.
No interpretation is readily apparent. The mean summary for 
the I-E X Reality interaction (Appendix T) revealed that in
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physical reality there was no difference between internally 
and externally oriented individuals. In social reality, the 
externally oriented person shifted markedly more (1.43). than 
did the internally oriented individual (.78). The mean sum­
mary for the Pressure X Reality interaction (Appendix U) 
showed that the condition of high pressure produced more 
judgmental shifting behavior than low pressure did for both 
realities. Further, under high pressure, more shifts 
occurred in physical than social reality.
Results for Hypothesis 1 
The means used to test hypothesis 1 are shown in Table 
5. The investigator hypothesized that high and low PRI- 
scorers do not differ in mean number of judgmental shifts, 
in physical reality with high pressure. The test of hypothesis 
1 is shown in Table 6. The outcome of the test did not 
contradict the hypothesis. The results clearly supported 
the notion that under physical reality, with high pressure 
exerted, there was no difference created for high and low 
PRI-scorers, and consequently, the mean number of.judgmental 
shifts did not differ.
Table 5
Means for PRI Categorization in Physical Reality
in High Pressure
Low PRI High PRI
2.21 2.35
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Table 6
Orthogonal Planned Comparison Test 
of Hypothesis 1
Comparison Difference F P
High PRI-P.R.-H.P.
minus
Low PRI-P.R.-H.P. .14 .006 N.S.
Results for Hypothesis 2 
The means used to test hypothesis 2 are found in Table 7. 
The E hypothesized that high PRI-scorers shifts more in judg­
ment than low PRI-scorers when in the condition of social 
reality with high pressure exerted. The test of hypothesis 
2 is shown in Table 8. The results refuted the hypothesis.
The condition of social reality was expected to be a more am­
biguous and unclear one, with only consensual validation as 
a reference point, and was expected to force the Ss to move 
more to the majority opinion. The researcher expected high 
PRI-scorers to have shifted more than low PRI-scorers since 
need-for-approval was expected to be operative, but this 
was not the case as evidence by the results.
Table 7
Judgmental Shift Means for PRI Categorization 
in Social Reality in High Pressure
LOW PRI High PRI
.95 1.79
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Table 8
Orthogonal Planned.Comparison Test 
of Hypothesis 2
Comparison Difference F P
Hiqh PRI-S.R.-H.P.
minus 
Low PRI»S.R.~H.P. .84 201 N.S.
Results for Hypotheses 3a and 3b
The means comprising the basis for testing these hypo-
theses are found in Table 9. The investigator hypothesized 
that low PRI-scorers are not differentially sensitive in 
either physical or social reality, while high PRI-scorers 
would be more sensitive in social than physical reality.5 
Sensitivity was defined as the mean difference between high 
and low pressure in stated conditions. For convenience, 
derivation of the sensitivity criterion is shown in 
Table 10. The results of the planned comparison tests for 
hypotheses 3a and 3b are found in Table 11. The results 
supported the hypothesis for low PRI-scorers, but refuted 
the hypothesis for high PRI-scorers. Thus, low PRI-scorers 
did not differ in number of judgmental shifts in feither 
reality. It seemed that for high PRI-scorers, the level of 
reality did not make a difference in shifts in judgment. 
High PRI-scorers were not more sensitive in social reality 
than physical reality as had been predicted.
29
Table 9
Means for Tests of Hypotheses 3a and 3b
Social Reality Physical Reality
Low PRI Hiqh PRI Low PRI High PRI
H.P. L.Po H.P. L.P. H.P. L.P. H.P. L.P.
.95 .75 1.79 .45 2.21 .44 2.35 .35
Table 10
Derivation of the Sensitivity Criteriona
Social Reality Physical Reality
Low PRI Hiqh PRI Low PRI High PRI
.20 1.34 1.77 2.00
a_ _ _
X (high pressure) - X (low pressure)
Table 11
Planned Comparison Tests of 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b
cLComparisons Difference F P
Low PRI-Scorers
(Hypothesis 3a) -1.57 .35 N.S.
Hiqh PRI-Scorers
(Hypothesis 3b) - .66 .06 N.S.
aSocial (High - Low Pressure) - Physical (High - Low Pressure)
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Hypothesis 1 stated that low and high PRI-scorers do 
not differ in number of judgmental shifts, when high pressure 
was exerted in a condition of physical reality. Hypothesis 
2 stated that high nApp Ss (high PRI—scorers) shift more 
than low nApp Ss (low PRI-scorers) when confronted with 
high pressure in social reality. Social reality, due to 
its perceptually ambiguous nature, was‘expected to be ; a 
situation where nApp would have been operative and neces­
sitated that high nApp Ss shift to the majority opinion. 
Hypothesis 3a stated that low PRI-scorers are not differ­
entially sensitive in either physical or social reality, 
with sensitivity being measured as the mean difference 
between high and low pressure. Hypothesis 3b stated that 
high PRI-scorers are more sensitive in social than physical 
reality. Hypothesis 1 and 3a were supported, but hypotheses 
2 and 3b were not supported.
No hypotheses were specified with regard to the in­
ternal versus external control dimension, due to the spar­
sity of research relating I-E to conformity. The obtained 
results agree with the literature (Odell, 1959; Greene, 
Lotsof, and James, 1964) that externally oriented persons 
tend to conform or shift in judgment more than internally
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oriented persons. The simple effects test (Table 4) re­
vealed that I-E was significant for only high need-for- 
approval (high PRI-scorers); further that I—E was signifi­
cant only within the realm of social reality, but not 
physical reality. A person with a need—for—social-approval 
and who feels that accrual of reinforcement is a function 
of something other than his own ability, would tend to 
shift more in a situation where no direct referent or 
anchorage point was available. In social reality, a rein­
forcement is dependent on the consensus of others. Therefore, 
the expectancy of success would be a major variate in the 
prediction of judgmental shifts. Perhaps the I-E dimension 
is dependent or varies with the physical—social reality 
continuum. In physical reality, a situation is maintained 
where expectancy of success does not become operative and 
this may be due to the lack of ambiguity of the stimulus.
The result of hypothesis 1, that high nApp Ss do not 
shift more than low nApp Ss in physical reality is contra­
dictory to past research using the same stimuli (Crowne & 
Liverant, 1963; Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). However, the 
cited research did not utilize a simulated interaction pro­
cess, rather trained confederates were used to convey the 
manipulated information. Also, smaller samples were used 
in the past research. The investigator feels that future 
exploration of need-for-approval and physical reality is 
in order, to determine if an unambiguous stimulus situation 
will cause nApp to be operative.
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The results of hypothesis 3a are congruous with 
previous investigation of PRI effects. Low need-for- 
approval persons do not shift their judgment or opinion, 
even when presented with a majority opinion contrary to 
espoused belief.
Hypotheses 2 and 3b are concerned with social reality 
and the shifts that were hypothecated to be forthcoming, 
but for unknown reasons, failed to materialize. This 
contradicts Festinger's (1950, 1954) suggestion that 
shifting should be greater in social reality conditions. 
Several tentative explanations will be discussed with the 
realization that these are only speculative in nature.
The J5 feels that social reality is not a unidimensional 
continuum, but rather is multidimensional in nature.
Some of the possible dimensions, not previously delinated 
by empirical research are: a sex-morality continuum; an
aesthetic taste continuum; and a culturally normative 
continuum. The investigator feels that lack of judg­
mental shifts may be due to the fact that only one of 
the possible dimensions was tapped. Another problem was 
that of the amount of pressure used in the experiment.
The present approach to the pressure dimension was used 
because the investigator felt that complete agreement or 
complete disagreement of peers over nine trials would 
have seemed false or would not have been perceived to 
be a real transmission of peers' judgments. In 
future research, three additional degrees of
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pressure should be attempted: unanimous agreement; total
disagreement, and an even number of agreeing and disagreeing 
opinions. When Asch (1951) changed the situation from that 
of a unanimous majority opposed to one, solitary individual 
to a situation where the individual had one other agreeing 
companion, the amount of exhibited conformity decreased 
markedly. Thus, future research should investigate the 
total continuum of pressure.
The major findings of the present investigation were:
1. High nApp Ss do not differ from low nApp Ss in mean 
number of judgmental shifts in physical reality when exposed 
to high pressure.
2. Low PRI-scorers do not differ in sensitivity in 
either physical or social reality.
3. There seems to be no apparent difference between 
high and low PRI-scorers in shifts in judgment in social 
reality, under conditions used in the present experiment.
4. A direct comparison of social reality and physical 
reality, as defined, failed for high PRI-scorers to reveal 
a distinction between their psychological relevance.
The investigator concluded that generalized expectancy 
of success is an important personality dimension and should 
be utilized alone or in combination with the need—for— 
approval dimension in future research attempts to predict 
arid/or find correlates of judgmental shifting behavior.
f
Further, there should be a continuation of work in an 
attempt to delineate the dimension called 'social reality'
if judgmental shifts are to be explained within a psycho­
logical framework.
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APPENDIX A
PHYSICAL REALITY SLIDES
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SOCIAL REALITY SLIDES
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APPENDIX C
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF AN INDIVIDUAL PANEL
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APPENDIX D
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE INDIVIDUAL PANELS CONNECTED
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APPENDIX E
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE INDIVIDUAL PANEL RATIO SELECTOR
5?
o  —-J X
T O
UJ
Figure A3
49
APPENDIX F
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE MASTER PANEL
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APPENDIX G
SCHEMATIC DRAWING OF THE MASTER PANEL CONNECTION 
TO THE INDIVIDUAL PANELS
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APPENDIX H
PERSONAL REACTION INVENTORY
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal 
attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the 
statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally.
Your answers to the items are to be recorded on a separate'
answer sheet. Take the answer sheet now, print your name 
and any other information requested on the answer sheet. 
Please indicate whether each statement is true or false as 
it pertains to you in the following manner:
Black-in (1) if the item is true
Black-in (2) if the item is false
Find the number of the item on the answer sheet and black—in 
the space under the number (1) or (2). Please answer all 
items.
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifica­
tions of all the candidates.
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone 
in trouble.
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if 
I am not encouraged.
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to
succeed in life.
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out
in a restaurant.
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure 
I was not seen I would probably do it.
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10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something 
because I thought too little of my ability.
11. I like to gossip at times.
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against
people in authority even though I knew they were right.
13. No matter who I'm talking to, i'm always a good 
listener.
14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of 
someone.
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
17. I always try to practice what I preach.
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along
with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and 
forget.
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind 
admitting it.
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are dis­
agreeable .
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my 
own way.
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing 
things.
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished 
for my wrong-doings.
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas 
very different from my own.
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety 
of my car.
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the 
good fortune of others.
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
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30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors 
of me.
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they 
only got what they deserved.
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt 
someone's feelings.
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APPENDIX I
DE KALB SURVEY TESTS 
Student Opinion Survey - Form I-E, 1 
Instructions
Below are a number of statements about various topics. They 
have been collected from different groups of people and re­
present a variety of opinions. There are no right or wrong 
answers to this questionnaire. For every statement there are 
large numbers of people who agree and disagree. Your answers 
to the items on this survey are to be recorded on a separate 
answer sheet which is loosely inserted in the booklet. RE­
MOVE THIS ANSWER SHEET NOW. Print your name and any other 
information requested by the examiner on the answer sheet, 
then finish reading these directions. Do not open the sur­
vey until you are told to do so. Please indicate whether 
you agree or disagree with each statement as follows:
Blacken in (1) SA if you strongly agree
Blacken in (2) A if you agree
Blacken in (3) D if you disagree
Blacken in (4) SD if you strongly disagree
Please read each item carefully and be sure that you indicate 
the response which most closely corresponds to the way which 
you personally feel by finding the number of the item on the 
answer sheet and blacking in the space under the number 1, 2, 
3 or 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SA A D SD 1. I like to read newspaper editorials
whether I agree with them-or not.
SA A D SD 2. Wars between countries seem inevit­
able despite efforts to prevent 
them.
SA A D SA 3. I believe the government should en­
courage more young people to make 
science a career.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
SA A D SD 4. It is usually true of successful
people that their good breaks far 
outweighed their bad breaks.
SA A D SD 5. I believe that moderation in all
things is the key to happiness.
SA A D SD 6. Many times I feel that we might
just as well make many of our de­
cisions by flipping a coin.
SA A D SD 7 . 1  disapprove of girls who smoke
cigarettes in public places.
SA A D SD 8. The actions of other people toward
me many times have me baffled.
SA A D SD 9. I believe it is more important for
a person to like his work than to 
make money at it.
SA A D SD 10. Getting a good job seems to be
largely a matter of being lucky
enough to be in the right place at
the right time.
SA A D SD 11. It's not what you know but who you
know that really counts in getting 
ahead.
SA A D SD 12. A great deal that happens to me is
probably just a matter of chance.
SA A D SD 13. I don't believe that the presidents
of our country should serve for more 
than two terms.
SA A D SD 14. I feel that I have little influence
overy the way people behave.
SA A D SD 15. It is difficult for me to keep well-
informed about foreign affairs.
SA A D SD 16. Much of the time the future seems
uncertain to me.
SA A D SD 17. I think the world is much more un­
settled now than it was in our 
grandfathers' times.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
SA A D SD 18, Some people seem born to fail while
others seem born for success no 
matter what they do.
SA A D SD 19. I believe there should be less
emphasis on spectator sports and 
more on athletic participation.
SA A D SD 20. It is difficult for ordinary people
to have much control over what 
politicians do in office.
SA A D SD 21. I enjoy reading a good book more
than watching television.
SA A D SD 22. I feel that many people could be
described as victims of circum­
stances beyond their control.
SA A D SD 23. Hollywood movies do not seem as good
as they used to be.
SA A D SD 24. It seems many times that the grades
one gets in school are more depen­
dent on the teachers' whims than on 
what the student can really do.
SA A D SD 25. Money shouldn't be a person's main
consideration in choosing a job.
SA A D SD 26. It isn't wise to plan too far
ahead because most things turn out 
to be a matter of good or bad for­
tune anyhow.
SA A D SD 27. At one time I wanted to become a
newspaper reporter.
SA A D SD 28. I can't understand how it is possi­
ble to predict other people's be­
havior.
SA A D SD 29. I believe that the U.S. needs a more
conservative foreign policy.
SA A D SD 30. When things are going well for me,
I consider it due to a run of good 
luck.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
SA A D SD 31. I believe the government has been
taking over too many of the affairs 
of private industrial management.
SA A D SD 32. There's not much use in trying to
predict which questions a teacher 
is going to ask on an examination.
SA A D SD 33. I get more ideas from talking about
things than reading about them.
SA A D SD 34. Most people don't realize the extent
to which their lives are controlled 
by accidental happenings.
SA A D SD 35. At one time I wanted to be an actor
(or actress).
SA A D SD 36. I have usually found that what is
going to happen will happen, regard­
less of my actions.
SA A D SD 37. Life in a small town offers more
real satisfactions than life in a 
large city.
SA A D SD 38. Most of the disappointing things in
my life have contained a large ele­
ment of chance.
SA A D SD 3 9. I would rather be a successful teach­
er than a successful business man.
SA A D SD 40. I don't believe that a person can
really be a master of his fate.
SA A D SD 41. I find mathematics easier to study
than literature.
SA A D SD 42. Success is mostly a matter of get­
ting good breaks.
SA A D SD 43. I think it is more important to be
respected by people than to be liked 
by them.
SA A D SD 44. Events in the world seem to be beyond
the control of most people.
SA A D SD 45. I think that states should be allowed
to handle racial problems without 
federal interference.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
SA A D SD 46. I feel that most people can't really
be held responsible for themselves 
since no one has much choice about 
where he was born or raised.
SA A D SD 47, I like to figure out problems and
puzzles that other people have 
trouble with.
SA A D SD 48. Many times the reactions of people
seem haphazard to me.
SA A D SD 49. I rarely lose when playing card games
SA A D SD 50. There's not much use in worrying
about things...what will be, will 
be.
SA A D SD 51. I think that everyone should belong
to some kind of church.
SA A D SD 52. Success in dealing with people seems
to be more a matter of the other 
person's moods and feelings at the 
time rather than one's own actions.
SA A D SD 53. One should not place too much faith
in newspaper reports.
SA A D SD 54. I think that life is mostly a gamble.
SA A D SD 55. I am very stubborn when my mind is
made up about something.
SA A D SD 56. Many times I feel that I have little
influence over the things that happen 
to me.
SA A D SD 57. I like popular music better than
classical music.
SA A D SD 58. Sometimes I feel that I don't have
enough control over the direction 
my life is taking.
SA A D SD 59. I sometimes stick to difficult things
too long even when I know they are 
hopeless.
SA A D SD 60. Life is too full of uncertainties.
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APPENDIX J
AWARENESS CRITERIA
CRITERIA: Sjl' knowledge of deception. Knowledge of misin­
formation. Information not truthfully reported 
by E..
Suspected peer's reactions were contrived. 
Suspicion that fellow S_s were not the source of 
agreement or disagreement.
EXAMPLES OF NON AWARENESS:
"Not everyone could agree or disagree with my opinion."
"I know I wasn't wrong that many times."
"You were studying conformity."
"You were checking the influence of the group on an 
individual's perception."
EXAMPLES OF AWARENESS:
"I knew you were falsifying the data."
"I wasn't receiving the true responses of the other Ss_; 
the E_ was controlling what I saw."
"What I saw was always created to try and force me to 
change my mind."
"The lights I saw did not represent the responses of 
the other Ss."
"You were controlling the lights."
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APPENDIX K
PHYSICAL REALITY INSTRUCTIONS
Hello, I am Mr. Blonsky, a graduate student in Psychol­
ogy. Please turn the form in front of you over and fill out 
the required information.
This is an experiment in perceptual speed and discrim­
ination. I am going to show you some slides for a short 
exposure. On these slides you will see two groups of dots. 
Your task is to indicate which of the two groups of dots 
contains the larger number of dots. You will not be allowed 
to talk at any time. The means of communication is the 
electrical panel which is before you. The switch on the 
right side of the panel is the way you indicate to me that 
you have made a choice. If you feel the group of dots at 
the left side of the slide is larger, flip the switch to the
up position. (Please try this now.) If you feel the group
of dots on the right side of the slide is larger, flip the 
switch to the down position. Try it. The 4 pair of lights 
you see on the panel will allow you to see how many people 
agree with your choice and how many people disagree with 
your choice.
Upon my showing a slide, you will respond with the 
electrical switch; then please mark your choice in the ap­
propriate column, labelled Trial 1, on the answer sheet be­
fore you, marking the letter which is larger beside the 
number of the slide being shown. When all five of you have 
replied, you will see how many others agree or disagree with
your choice. The upper row of green lights indicates how
many people agree with your choice and the lower row of red 
lights indicates how many people disagree with your choice. 
After seeing the choices of the others, you will have an 
opportunity to make a second decision. This choice is to 
be entered in the column labelled Trial 2. Flip the switch 
to indicate your second choice. This process will be con­
tinued for all the slides. After you have marked your 
second decision in Column 2, please flip the switch to the 
middle position, which is the off position. Please remember 
to mark your choice down on the answer sheet in the appro­
priate position after every slide is shown, as well as by 
flipping the switch on the panel. The sTides will be shown 
on the screen in the front of the room, one at a time. Please
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do not communicate with anyone or attempt to do so.
Upon completion of the series of slides, E_ passed out 
a questionnaire and said:
Please fill out this questionnaire.
Name__________________________ __
In your own words, briefly tell me what you 
think this experiment was about.
The nature of the present experiment does not allow a de­
tailed explanation at this time, but you will be completely 
informed of the nature and purpose of this experiment at a 
future date. Please do not discuss this experiment with 
anyone. Thank you for your cooperation and participation.
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APPENDIX L
SOCIAL REALITY INSTRUCTIONS
Hello, I am Mr. Blonsky, a graduate student in Psychol­
ogy. Please turn the form in front of you over and fill out 
the required information.
This is an experiment in ability to discriminate. I am 
going to show some slides for a short exposure. On these 
slides you will see pictures of men, some of whom have been 
convicted of murder. Your task is to decide which is a mur­
derer. You will not be allowed to talk at any time. The 
means of communication is the electrical panel which is be­
fore you. The switch on the right side of the panel is the 
way you indicate to me that you have made a choice. If you 
believe the man is a murderer, flip the switch to the up 
position. (Please try this now). If you do not feel the 
man is a murderer, flip the switch to the down position.
Try it. The four pair of'lights you see on the panel will 
allow you to see how many of the other people agree with 
your choice and how many of the other people disagree with 
your choice.
When you see the pictures, you will respond with the 
electrical switch, then mark your response in the appro­
priate column, labelled Trial 1, on the answer sheet before 
you, writing either a "yes" or a "no" beside the number of 
the slide being shown. When all five of you have replied, 
you will see how many others agree or disagree with your 
choice. The upper row of green lights will indicate how 
many people agree with your choice and the lower row of red 
lights will indicate how many people disagree with your de­
cision. After seeing the choices of the others, you will 
have an opportunity to make another decision. This choice 
is to be entered in the column labelled "Trial 2" on your 
answer sheet. Flip the switch after your second choice.
This process will be continued for all the slides. After 
you have marked each response and flipped the electrical 
switch, turn the switch to the middle position, which is 
the off position. Try this. Please remember to mark your 
choices down on the answer sheet in the appropriate posi­
tion after every slide is shown, as well as flipping the 
switch on the panel. The slides will be shown on the screen 
in the front of the room, one at a time. Please do not
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communicate with anyone or attempt to do so.
Upon completion of the series of slides, E. passed out 
a questionnaire and said:
Please fill out this questionnaire.
Name__________________________
In your own words, briefly tell me what you think 
this experiment was about.
The nature of the present experiment does not allow a de­
tailed explanation at this time, but you will be completely 
informed of the nature and purpose of this experiment at a 
future date. Please do not discuss this experiment with 
anyone. Thank you for your cooperation and participation.
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APPENDIX M
PHYSICAL REALITY ANSWER SHEETS 
DAY_______ ____________
TIME_______________________  Name:__ __________ _
Please mark which cluster of dots on each slide is larger. 
Write the letter of the larger cluster in the appropriate 
column below. After seeing the responses of the other 
members of the group, you will be allowed to reply a second
9
time. Please reply the second time in the column marked 
"Column 2".
SLIDES TRIAL 1 TRIAL 2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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APPENDIX N
SOCIAL REALITY ANSWER SHEETS 
DAY_________________ _
TIME____________________    Name_____________
Please indicate if you feel the following men are convicted 
murderers or not. Mark "yes" or "no" in the appropriate 
column below. After seeing the responses of the other mem­
bers of the group, you will be allowed to reply a second
time. Please reply the second time in the column marked
"Column 2".
SLIDES _________ TRIAL 1___________TRIAL 2
JU_____________ ____________________ _ ___________________
2.  ; : _
3  . ______________________________   :____ .
4  ._______:_____________________________________ _
5 . _____________________________________________
6  ._____________________, ______________
]_.________________________________________________________
8.   ____
9.
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APPENDIX O
Table Al
Personal Reaction Inventory Scale Norms
Sample Sex Number
of
Cases
Mean
University of Omaha Males
Introductory Psychology 
students (1964)
University of Omaha Females
Introductory Psychology 
students (1964)
University of Omaha Males
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966)
University of Omaha Females
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966)
University of Omaha Males
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966)
University of Omaha Females
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966)
University of Omaha Males
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
1st Semester
433
409
431
378
127
100
448
13. 53
15.05
13. 80
14. 61
13. 84
14.05
14. 26
University of Omaha 
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
1st Semester
Females 390 16.04
S.D.
5. 36 
5.42 
5. 56 
5 . 65 
5.53 
5.83 
5.14
5.08
Sample Sex Number
of
Cases
Mean
( 3-)University of Omaha 
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
Industrial Executives 
Tested at University 
of Omaha 1964-66
University of Omaha 
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
2nd Semester
Females
Males
Males
154
78
336
15.79
19.14
14. 57
University of Omaha 
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
2nd Semester
Females 159 16. 31
67
S.D.
5. 20 
5. 83 
5.46
5. 39
a^^Used in experiment.
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APPENDIX P
Table A 2
James (1963) I-E Scale Norms
Sample Sex Number
of
Cases
Mean
University of Omaha 
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
Males
University of Omaha Females
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
( cl}University of Omaha 
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
1st Semester
Females
448
390
154
41. 31
38.86
39. 58
University of Omaha Males-
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
2nd Semester
University of Omaha Females
Introductory Psychology 
students (1966-67)
2nd Semester
336
159
40. 55
39. 96
9. 22
9. 04
9.19
9.86
8. 27
a^^Used in experiment.
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APPENDIX Q
High PRI Low PRI
Internal External Internal External
H. P. L . P. H. P. L. P. H. P. L. P. H. P. L.P.
Physical
Reality 7 14 10 9 9 7 10 9
Social
Reality 13 14 6 6 10 6 10 14
Figure A6 . Composition of Experimental Groups.
70
APPENDIX R 
Table A3
Mean Summaries of Judgmental Shifts 
Across Nine Trials
High PRI Low PRI ■
Internal External Internal External
H. P. L. P. H. P. L. P. H. P. L. P. H. P. L. P,
Physical
Reality 1. 29 . 29 3.10 .44 3.11 .43 1.40 .44
Social
Reality 1. 31 . 29 2.83 .83 .50 1.00 1. 40 . 64
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APPENDIX S
Table A4
Simple Effect Mean Summary for 
PRI X I—E
High PRI Low PRI
1. 2679
Internal
n=48 n-32
971.80
External
n=43n=31
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APPENDIX T
Table A5
Simple Effect Mean Summary for 
I—E X Reality
Internal External
1. 28 1. 35
Physical Reality
n=38n=37
1.43.78
Social Reality
n=36
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APPENDIX U
Table A6
Simple Effect Mean Summary for 
Pressure X Reality
High Pressure Low Pressure
2. 23 .40
Physical Reality
n=36
1. 51 .69
Social Reality
n=39 n=40
